PRACTICAL NATURE OF IMAGINATION

PRACTICAL NATURE OF IMAGINATION.--Imagination is not a process of
thought which must deal chiefly with unrealities and impossibilities,
and which has for its chief end our amusement when we have nothing
better to do than to follow its wanderings. It is, rather, a
commonplace, necessary process which illumines the way for our everyday
thinking and acting--a process without which we think and act by
haphazard chance or blind imitation. It is the process by which the
images from our past experiences are marshaled, and made to serve our
present. Imagination looks into the future and constructs our patterns
and lays our plans. It sets up our ideals and pictures us in the acts of
achieving them. It enables us to live our joys and our sorrows, our
victories and our defeats before we reach them. It looks into the past
and allows us to live with the kings and seers of old, or it goes back
to the beginning and we see things in the process of the making. It
comes into our present and plays a part in every act from the simplest
to the most complex. It is to the mental stream what the light is to the
traveler who carries it as he passes through the darkness, while it
casts its beams in all directions around him, lighting up what otherwise
would be intolerable gloom.

The Legislature of 1834 acted with wisdom and energy

The Legislature of 1834 acted with wisdom and energy. The school fund
having been established, the towns were next required to furnish answers
to certain questions that were substituted for the requisition of the
statute of 1826, and any town whose committee failed to make the return
was to be deprived of its share of the income of the school fund,
whenever it should be first distributed. (Res. 1834, chap. 78.)

(2) But farther, the real simplicity lies on the side of independent

and disinterested benevolence
(2) But farther, the real simplicity lies on the side of independent
and disinterested benevolence. There are bodily appetites that carry us
to their objects before sensual enjoyment; hunger and thirst have
eating and drinking for their end; the gratification follows, and
becomes a secondary desire. [A very questionable analysis.] So there
are mental passions, as fame, power, vengeance, that urge us to act, in
the first instance; and when the end is attained, the pleasure follows.
Now, as vengeance may be so pursued as to make us neglect ease,
interest, and safety, why may we not allow to humanity and friendship
the same privileges? [This is Butler, improved in the statement.]

Although imagination enters every field of human experience, and busies

itself with every line of human interest, yet all its activities can be
classed under two different types
Although imagination enters every field of human experience, and busies
itself with every line of human interest, yet all its activities can be
classed under two different types. These are (1) _reproductive_, and (2)
_creative_ imagination.

KANT

KANT. Distinguishes between the empirical and the rational mode of
treating Ethics. Nothing properly good, except _Will_. Subjection of
Will to Reason. An action done from natural inclination is worthless
morally. Duty is respect for Law; conformity to Law is the one
principle of volition. Moral Law not ascertainable empirically, it
must originate _a priori_ in pure (practical) Reason. The Hypothetical
and Categorical Imperatives. Imperative of Prudence. Imperative of
Morality. The formula of Morality. The ends of Morality. The Rational
nature of man is an end-in-itself. The Will the source of its own
laws--the Autonomy of the Will. The Reason of Ends. Morality alone has
intrinsic Worth or Dignity. Principles founded on the Heteronomy of
the Will--Happiness, Perfection. Duty legitimized by the conception of
the Freedom of the Will, properly understood. Postulates of the pure
Practical Reason--Freedom, Immortality, God. Summary.

Phelps, Edward Bunnell: _The Mortality from Alcohol in the United

States_, Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene
and Demography, Washington, 1912, Vol
Phelps, Edward Bunnell: _The Mortality from Alcohol in the United
States_, Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene
and Demography, Washington, 1912, Vol. I, p. 813.

There are only two kinds of social structure conceivable--

personal government and impersonal government
There are only two kinds of social structure conceivable--
personal government and impersonal government. If my
anarchic friends will not have rules--they will have rulers.
Preferring personal government, with its tact and flexibility,
is called Royalism. Preferring impersonal government,
with its dogmas and definitions, is called Republicanism.
Objecting broadmindedly both to kings and creeds is called Bosh;
at least, I know no more philosophic word for it. You can
be guided by the shrewdness or presence of mind of one ruler,
or by the equality and ascertained justice of one rule; but you must
have one or the other, or you are not a nation, but a nasty mess.
Now men in their aspect of equality and debate adore the idea
of rules; they develop and complicate them greatly to excess.
A man finds far more regulations and definitions in his club,
where there are rules, than in his home, where there is a ruler.
A deliberate assembly, the House of Commons, for instance,
carries this mummery to the point of a methodical madness.
The whole system is stiff with rigid unreason;
like the Royal Court in Lewis Carroll. You would think
the Speaker would speak; therefore he is mostly silent.
You would think a man would take off his hat to stop and put
it on to go away; therefore he takes off his hat to walk out
and puts in on to stop in. Names are forbidden, and a man
must call his own father 'my right honorable friend the member
for West Birmingham.' These are, perhaps, fantasies of decay:
but fundamentally they answer a masculine appetite.
Men feel that rules, even if irrational, are universal;
men feel that law is equal, even when it is not equitable.
There is a wild fairness in the thing--as there is in tossing up.

Of the other Laws of Nature, treated in Chap

Of the other Laws of Nature, treated in Chap. XV., the third, _that men
perform their covenants made_, opens up the discussion of _Justice_.
Till rights have been transferred and covenants made there is no
justice or injustice; injustice is no other than the non-performance of
covenants. Further, justice (and also property) begins only where a
regular coercive power is constituted, because otherwise there is cause
for fear, and fear, as has been seen, makes covenants invalid. Even the
scholastic definition of justice recognizes as much; for there can be
no constant will of giving to every man his own, when, as in the state
of nature, there is no _own_. He argues at length against the idea that
justice, _i.e._, the keeping of covenants, is contrary to reason;
repelling three different arguments. (1) He demonstrates that it cannot
be reasonable to break or keep covenants according to benefit supposed
to be gained in each case, because this would be a subversion of the
principles whereon society is founded, and must end by depriving the
individual of its benefits, whereby he would be left perfectly
helpless. (2) He considers it frivolous to talk of securing the
happiness of heaven by any kind of injustice, when there is but one
possible way of attaining it, viz., the keeping of covenants. (3) He
warns men (he means his contemporaries) against resorting to the mode
of injustice known as rebellion to gain sovereignty, from the
hopelessness of gaining it and the uncertainty of keeping it. Hence he
concludes that justice is a rule of reason, the keeping of covenants
being the surest way to preserve our life, and therefore a law of
nature. He rejects the notion that laws of nature are to be supposed
conducive, not to the preservation of life on earth, but to the
attainment of eternal felicity; whereto such breach of covenant as
rebellion may sometimes be supposed a means. For that, the knowledge of
the future life is too uncertain. Finally, he consistently holds that
faith is to be kept with heretics and with all that it has once been
pledged to.

He commences by quoting Hutcheson"s doctrine of a Moral Sense, which he

describes as an _implanted_ and _arbitrary_ principle, imparting a
relish or disrelish for actions, like the sensibilities of the various
senses
He commences by quoting Hutcheson"s doctrine of a Moral Sense, which he
describes as an _implanted_ and _arbitrary_ principle, imparting a
relish or disrelish for actions, like the sensibilities of the various
senses. On this doctrine, he remarks, the Creator might have annexed
the same sentiments to the opposite actions. Other schemes of morality,
such as Self-love, Positive Laws and Compacts, the Will of the Deity,
he dismisses as not meeting the true question.

The old notion that our bodies are changed every seven years, science

has long since exploded
The old notion that our bodies are changed every seven years, science
has long since exploded. 'The matter,' said Mr. John Goodsir, 'of the
organized frame to its minutest parts is in a continual flux.' Our
bodies are never the same for any two successive days. The feet that
Mary shall dance with next Christmas Eve will not be the same feet
that bore her triumphantly through the previous Christmas holidays.
The brain that she learns German with to-day does not contain a cell
in its convolutions that was spent in studying French one year ago.
Whether her present feet can dance better or worse than those of a
year ago, and whether her present brain can _do_ more or less German
and French than the one of the year before, depends upon how she has
used her feet and brain during the intervening time, that is, upon the
metamorphosis of her tissue.

To obey reason is, then, the first duty, at the root of all others, and

itself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason;
in a sense, to remain reasonable is the sole duty
To obey reason is, then, the first duty, at the root of all others, and
itself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason;
in a sense, to remain reasonable is the sole duty. But it assumes
special forms amid the diversity of human relations. He first considers
the relations wherein we stand to ourselves and the corresponding
duties. That there should be any such duties is at first sight strange,
seeing we belong to ourselves; but this is not the same as having
complete power over ourselves. Possessing liberty, we must not abdicate
it by yielding to passions, and treat ourselves as if there were
nothing in us that merits respect. We are to distinguish between what
is peculiar to each of us, and what we share with humanity. Individual
peculiarities are things indifferent, but the liberty and intelligence
that constitute us persons, rather than individuals, demand to be
respected even by ourselves. There is an obligation of self-respect
imposed upon us as moral persons that was not established, and is not
to be destroyed, by us. As special cases of this respect of the moral
person in us, he cites (1) the duty of _self-control_ against anger or
melancholy, not for their pernicious consequences, but as trenching
upon the moral dignity of liberty and intelligence; (2) the duty of
_prudence_, meaning providence in all things, which regulates courage,
enjoins temperance, is, as the ancients said, the mother of all the
virtues,--in short, the government of liberty by reason; (3)
_veracity_; (4) duty towards the _body_; (5) duty of _perfecting_ (and
not merely keeping intact) the intelligence, liberty, and sensibility
that constitute us moral beings.

VI

VI.--He recognizes no relationship between Ethics and Theology. The
principle of Benevolence in the human mind is, he thinks, an adequate
source of moral approbation and disapprobation; and he takes no note of
what even sceptics (Gibbon, for example) often dwell upon, the aid of
the Theological sanction in enforcing duties imperfectly felt by the
natural and unprompted sentiments of the mind.

THE NORMAL WILL

THE NORMAL WILL.--The golden mean between these two abnormal types of
will may be called the _normal_ or _balanced_ will. Here there is a
proper ratio between impulsion and inhibition. Ideas are not acted upon
the instant they enter the mind without giving time for a survey of the
field of motives, neither is action 'sicklied o"er with the pale cast of
thought' to such an extent that it becomes impossible. The evidence is
all considered and each motive fully weighed. But this once done,
decision follows. No dilatory and obstructive tactics are allowed. The
fleeting impulse is not enough to persuade to action, neither is action
unduly delayed after the decision is made.

The Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public

affairs, but the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active
citizenship
The Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public
affairs, but the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active
citizenship. Chrysippus even said that the life of philosophical
contemplation (such as Aristotle preferred, and accounted godlike) was
to be placed on the same level with the life of pleasure; though
Plutarch observes that neither Chrysippus nor Zeno ever meddled
personally with any public duty; both of them passed their lives in
lecturing and writing. The truth is that both of them were foreigners
residing at Athens; and at a time when Athens was dependent on foreign
princes. Accordingly, neither Zeno nor Chrysippus had any sphere of
political action open to them; they were, in this respect, like
Epictetus afterwards--but in a position quite different from Seneca,
the preceptor of Nero, who might hope to influence the great imperial
power of Rome, and from Marcus Antoninus, who held that imperial power
in his own hands.

The cases which have hitherto been presented illustrate some of the

evils which the reproductive system is apt to receive in consequence
of obvious derangement of its growth and functions
The cases which have hitherto been presented illustrate some of the
evils which the reproductive system is apt to receive in consequence
of obvious derangement of its growth and functions. But it may, and
often does, happen that the catamenia are normally performed, and that
the reproductive system is fairly made up during the educational
period. Then force is withdrawn from the brain and nerves and
ganglia. These are dwarfed or checked or arrested in their
development. In the process of waste and repair, of destructive and
constructive metamorphosis, by which brains as well as bones are built
up and consolidated, education often leaves insufficient margin for
growth. Income derived from air, food, and sleep, which should
largely, may only moderately exceed expenditure upon study and work,
and so leave but little surplus for growth in any direction; or, what
more commonly occurs, the income which the brain receives is all spent
upon study, and little or none upon its development, while that which
the nutritive and reproductive systems receive is retained by them,
and devoted to their own growth. When the school makes the same steady
demand for force from girls who are approaching puberty, ignoring
Nature"s periodical demands, that it does from boys, who are not
called upon for an equal effort, there must be failure somewhere.
Generally either the reproductive system or the nervous system
suffers. We have looked at several instances of the former sort of
failure; let us now examine some of the latter.

Fortunately, the same crowded city conditions which make moral isolation

possible, constantly tend to develop a new restraint founded upon the
mutual dependences of city life and its daily necessities
Fortunately, the same crowded city conditions which make moral isolation
possible, constantly tend to develop a new restraint founded upon the
mutual dependences of city life and its daily necessities. The city
itself socializes the very instruments that constitute the apparatus of
social control--Law, Publicity, Literature, Education and Religion.
Through their socialization, the desirability of chastity, which has
hitherto been a matter of individual opinion and decision, comes to be
regarded, not only as a personal virtue indispensable in women and
desirable in men, but as a great basic requirement which society has
learned to demand because it has been proven necessary for human
welfare. To the individual restraints is added the conviction of social
responsibility and the whole determination of chastity is reinforced by
social sanctions. Such a shifting to social grounds is already obviously
taking place in regard to the chastity of women. Formerly all that the
best woman possessed was a negative chastity which had been carefully
guarded by her parents and duennas. The chastity of the modern woman of
self-directed activity and of a varied circle of interests, which gives
her an acquaintance with many men as well as women, has therefore a new
value and importance in the establishment of social standards. There was
a certain basis for the belief that if a woman lost her personal virtue,
she lost all; when she had no activity outside of domestic life, the
situation itself afforded a foundation for the belief that a man might
claim praise for his public career even when his domestic life was
corrupt. As woman, however, fulfills her civic obligations while still
guarding her chastity, she will be in position as never before to uphold
the 'single standard,' demanding that men shall add the personal virtues
to their performance of public duties. Women may at last force men to do
away with the traditional use of a public record as a cloak for a
wretched private character, because society will never permit a woman to
make such excuses for herself.

The Legislature of 1834 acted with wisdom and energy

The Legislature of 1834 acted with wisdom and energy. The school fund
having been established, the towns were next required to furnish answers
to certain questions that were substituted for the requisition of the
statute of 1826, and any town whose committee failed to make the return
was to be deprived of its share of the income of the school fund,
whenever it should be first distributed. (Res. 1834, chap. 78.)

Chapter II

Chapter II. is on the Moral Faculty, and is intended to show that it is
an original principle of the mind. He first replies to the theory that
identifies Morality with Prudence, or Self-love. His first argument is
the existence in all languages of different words for _duty_ and for
_interest_. Secondly, The emotions arising from, the contemplation of
right and wrong are different from those produced by a regard to our
own happiness. Thirdly, although in most instances a sense of duty, and
an enlightened regard to our own happiness, would suggest to us the
same line of conduct, yet this truth is not obvious to mankind
generally, who are incapable of appreciating enlarged views and remote
consequences. He repeats the common remark, that we secure our
happiness best by not looking to it as tho one primary end. Fourthly,
moral judgments appear in children, long before they can form the
general notion of happiness. His examples of this position, however,
have exclusive reference to the sentiment of pity, which all moralists
regard as a primitive feeling, while few admit it to be the same as the
moral sense.

And here, for once, in Massachusetts, a public institution has escaped

the tyranny of bricks and mortar; and we are permitted to indulge the
hope, that any future additions will tend to make this spot a
neighborhood of unostentatious cottages, quiet rural homes, rather than
the seat of a vast edifice, which may provoke the wonder of the
sight-seer, inflame local or state pride, but can never be an effectual,
economical agency in the work of reformation
And here, for once, in Massachusetts, a public institution has escaped
the tyranny of bricks and mortar; and we are permitted to indulge the
hope, that any future additions will tend to make this spot a
neighborhood of unostentatious cottages, quiet rural homes, rather than
the seat of a vast edifice, which may provoke the wonder of the
sight-seer, inflame local or state pride, but can never be an effectual,
economical agency in the work of reformation. Every public institution
has some great object. Architecture should bend itself to that object,
and become its servant; and it must ever be deemed a mistake, when
utility is sacrificed that art or fancy may have its way.

The educational significance of the truths illustrated in the diagram

and the discussion has been somewhat slow in taking hold in our schools
The educational significance of the truths illustrated in the diagram
and the discussion has been somewhat slow in taking hold in our schools.
This has been due not alone to the slowness of the educational world to
grasp a new idea, but also to the practical difficulties connected with
adapting the school exercises as well to the expression side of
education as to the impression. From the fall of Athens on down to the
time of Froebel the schools were constituted on the theory that pupils
were to _receive_ education; that they were to _drink in_ knowledge,
that their minds were to be _stored_ with facts. Children were to 'be
seen and not heard.' Education was largely a process of gorging the
memory with information.